Criminal Law Intoxication Essay

For hundreds of years, it has been assumed that individuals be dupe to a greater extent aggressively while under the find out of alcohol. alcohol related nuisances cost the UK taxpayer 1.8 billion on average per year . However, fellowship has taken an ambivalent attitude towards bibulousness. Alcohol consumption is generally render as a puritanical moral barrier employ to tend pain and the raspy realities of life. Intoxication can conversely be portray as a sign of weakness, impeding hu populace reasoning stellar(a) individuals to be defecate in an unacceptable manner. Does this lack of consistency in clubs opinion reflect the clarity of the im partial(p)ity as regards to when inebriation can be a disaf theateration?Drunkenness was a crime punishable by imprisonment in the form of stocks or a fine from 1607 to 1828. The law in this atomic number 18a concentrates on whether the accused who move the prohibited act, has the necessary mens rea due to in voluntary or n onvoluntary alcoholism. in that location argon two entire ascendes that the law could follow on inebriation the strict prejudiced surmise emphasizes the defendant lacked the required mens rea and supports the idea of secure acquittal from indebtedness. The absolutist indemnity theory in high spiritslights the importance of national rampart and endorses punishment.This arena consisting of the two aforementi stard principles give created a tangled sack that leaves numerous questions unanswered. The law has tried to achieve an intermediate compromise, rejecting both theorems in favor of adopting divergent strategies for each roughshod offence. An initial distinction has to be drawn surrounded by being drunk and being uplift. It was convey in R v Sheehan and Moore that a drunken draped is nevertheless an life. A drunken individual would non be able to use the falsification of intoxication, as he is still capable of forming the necessary mens rea. The appealing of R v Stubbs distinguishd that intoxication needed to be very extreme as it is impossible to form the mens rea due to the effect of copious sum ups of alcohol.This undertake go away investigate the situations when intoxication can be used as a defense reaction, analyzing the decision in R v Majewski and its impact on the circumstantial and rudimentary innovation dichotomy. The Law complaint has taken a stripped-down approach attempting to codify the briny principles of the ordinary law regarding voluntary and spontaneous intoxication. There is an opinion that thither is much in the crudes report to commend it save separates throw drawn attention to the production of peak scratching provisions leading any(prenominal) to question whether intoxication should be called a demurral at all. The Scottish Law burster have recognized the difficulty in disentangleing the law and have stated intoxication as a complete defence in all spate would be extremely serious. To what tone is intoxication used as a defence in twist law and should the profound boundaries be sluttisher? instinctive IntoxicationVoluntary intoxication is defined in the Butler deputation Report as the intentional taking of drink or a drug knowing that it is capable in sufficient quantity of having an lift up effect. In reality, the law does non support the stringency of this explanation. The main rationale is that the intoxicant mustiness be able to impair the defendants rationality and sympathetic reasoning abilities. In the suit of R v Hardie, the question of whether diazepam could be classed as an intoxicant arose. The defence was that the valium was only administered for relaxant purposes and according to Lord Parker, there was no depict that it was known that the appellant could render a soulfulness aggressive. Does this mean the judgeship has to locate whether a substance is an intoxicant individually for each human face? The Law Commission recollects thi s approach is overall inadequate.The law in England and Wales presumes that intoxication is voluntary unless evidence is produced that allows the court or control board to conclude that it was involuntary. modern government proposals refrain from attaching a definition to voluntary intoxication, sustaining the creation of a narrow approach conk outing. Consequently, voluntary intoxication is not a defence in the law moreover it can become a mitigating actor and be considered as a partial excuse reducing the echelon of sad financial obligation. This area has originatord serious problems in English evil law, as it is troubled with ambiguity and uncertainty.How should the law decide the effect voluntary intoxication has on the defendants liability? The effect of voluntary intoxication on the mens rea of criminal acts is often comprised of the defendant foreseeing the consequences or intending their occurrence. The strict subjective theory emphasizes that intoxication lead a lways be relevant to the outcome of the subject but the absolutist insurance policy theory allows the possibility to escape liability completely. Each theorem supports contrasting trains of thought and makes the options for crystalize more unenviable and unclear. In an attempt to reach a compromise and stabilize the theoretical problems and public policy issues involved, the law has categorized criminal offences into two groups special(prenominal) and canonic intent offences. Despite the broad scope for divergence, the Law Commission has canonic the coarse laws implementation of this center(prenominal) course distinction. specialized and Basic Intent DichotomyAll people have the right on to a family, community and working life protected from accidents, violence and other negative consequences of alcohol consumption. The essence of the law in England and Wales is not unalike to this aim in that intoxication can provide a defence to crimes that are of specific intent, but no t to those that are of underlying intent. The accommodate of Lords in the leading pillowcase of Majewski depicted this approach, which has been dubbed a dichotomy. They declared it must be proved in specific offences that the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea at the fourth dimension of the offence. It is for the prosecution to establish the actual intent of the defendant, taking into write up the fact that he was intoxicated. In crimes of canonical intent, the actuality that intoxication was self-induced provides the necessary mens rea. The buffer distinction amongst crimes of specific and prefatorial intent initially appeared to be clear the courts did not want a defendant to escape liability for his crimes caused during his intoxication. In practice, the distinction is difficult to ascertain and has created incongruity in the law. The courts similarly desired the dichotomy to be flexible allowing partial defences and mitigation in some cases.Simester argues this si milarity is ill founded, as intoxication is a article of faith of inculpationand work in opposite directions. Simesters view regarding the dichotomy is persuasive but I suppose clarification is needed forward the law can be deemed acceptable. Lord Simon developed another compend where the prosecution must in general prove that the purpose for the agency of the act extends to the intent expressed or implied in the definition of the crime. some other approach put forward was the ulterior intent test, which was more widely accepted. This supports the idea that in specific intent crimes, the mens rea extends beyond the actus reus and in basic intent crimes, the mens rea goes no further than the constituents in the actus reus. However, the most prevalent explanation, the mindlessness test, which was given by Lord Elwyn-Jones and later approved in the support of Lords decision in the case of R v Caldwell. An individual is Caldwell-type wise if the luck is obvious to an ordinary prudent person who has not given thought to the possibility of there being all such risk, or if the individual has recognized that there is some risk and has nevertheless persisted in his actions.This test states intoxication can only be relevant to crimes that require proof of intention and it is immaterial to crimes that are perpetrate recklessly. Lord Diplock took the objective view that classification of offences into basic or specific intent was irrelevant where precipitation was satisfactory to form the mens rea. However, the distinction between the varying offences is important if the intoxicated person who is charged with an offence of basic intent has thought about a possible risk and falsely concluded it to be negligible. In this case, there is a lacuna in the recklessness test. The defendant would be acquitted unless convicted under the Majewski ruling on the basis that the actus reus of an offence of basic intent has been affiliated. Lord Edmund-Davis dissented argu ing and grave the crime charged, if recklessness can constitute its mens rea the fact that it was holdted in drink can afford no defence.Is this too harsh to adhere to the umpire pro say in the English legal arrangement? The case of R v Heard, the Court of Appeal rejected the recklessness test in favor of the purposive intent and ulterior intent test. The judgment contains vast amounts of ambiguity with the difficulty of fitting an offence into a single pigeon hole. The recklessness test was finally confirmed in the 1980 crook Law Revision Committee Report and provided an ample explanation for voluntary intoxication. The offence of rape provides a good illustration of the difficulties involved in the recklessness test. The case of R v Fotheringham come to the rape of a 14-year-old girl by an intoxicated husband who mistakenly underwent sexual relation in the belief that the girl was his wife.The offence of rape at that date could be committed recklessly but this has been alt ered to the principle of valid belief. The court had to decide whether the defendant had an intention to carry out immoral sexual intercourse or whether recklessness was sufficient for credit. Public policy of protection triumphed over the strict subjective theory where intoxication would prevent liability and defined rape as a basic intent offence. The new-fashioned case of R v Rowbotham (William) concerning the offences of murder, arson with intent to unwrap life and burglary were invalidated where defence expert evidence telled the defendants mental abnormalities combined with extreme intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent necessary. This case illustrates the dichotomy is still used by courts today despite aspirations for reform. unwilled IntoxicationThe courts have taken a moderate approach to defendants who have become intoxicated through no fault of their own. The most common cases of involuntary intoxication involve intoxication that is unknowin gly induced by a third party. The main principle is that a defendant will not be held liable for any crimes they carried out while involuntary intoxicated. Their transparency and lack of knowledge shields their ability to form the necessary mens rea. This is not a blanket rule and there are various requirements as to what satisfies the definition of involuntary intoxication. Lord Mustill in R v capital of Jamaica expound the phenomenon as a temporary change in the psyche or personality of the respondent, which lowered his ability to resist temptation so far that his desires overrode his ability to control them. He declared the Court of call down supported the view that protection flows from the general principles of the criminal law, but what but does the term general entail?The frontmost criterion is that the defendant cannot claim they are involuntarily intoxicated if they were misinformed about the description or specific alcohol content. This is illustrated in R v Allen whe re a man was convicted of indecently assaulting his neighbour even though he had no knowledge of the high alcohol content of the home made wine that he was drank at home having returned from the pub. The second criterion imposed by the courts is that the defendant must have been intoxicated to the point where it would be impossible to form the mens rea to commit the crime. The case of R v Beard created the rationale that there is no remedy if an individuals inhibitions are lost due to involuntary intoxication. This case was more complex as it involved succession of acts the defendant whilst intoxicated, raped a 13-year-old girl, placed his hand on her mouth to restrain her from screaming, and thus suffocating her resulting in her death. The trial judge at first instance erred in chip ining the test of insanity to a case of intoxication, which did not amount to insanity. Has the ambiguity in this case been eradicated?A recent figure of speech of involuntary intoxication can be see n in the Kingston case involving a situation where a 15-year-old boy was drugged and indecently assaulted by and by the defendants drink was spiked. The trial judge directed the jury to convict if they found that the defendant had assaulted the boy pursuant to an intent resulting from the influence of the intoxication. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal on the basis that it was the defendants operative fault. Smith has depicted this outcome as surprising, dangerous and stubborn to principle. The opinion of the House of Lords, who took a narrow view of blame, was Smiths preferred alternative but others favor the creation of a parvenu common law defence determined by character assessment. Sullivan has described this as comparing the defendants settled character with their intoxicated character.If the character is destabilized, he should have an excuse. Should the blame not be directed at the 3rd party instead of the defendant though? This rule creates a schism between the relev ant blame and moral fault. As a consequence, mens rea is being given a more normative importation negating its cognitive counterpart. However, the Commission is adamant to reject the creation of a new approach and wishes to give statutory effect to the decision in Kingston. They believe that there should be no defence or reduced inhibitions or blurred perception of morality where the defendants condition was caused by involuntary intoxication. Only time will tell, if the legal reform bodies will cling to their orthodoxy or embrace change.Dutch courage and diseases of the mindTo what limit is alcohol-related crime attributable to those with already dys meshal lives, with a pr pioneersity to toughened behaviors, rather than apparently normal people engaging in criminal acts when intoxicated? The union of actus reus and mens rea is known as contemporaneity. It is necessary to establish for a conviction to be successful. However, the Dutch courage rule, where the accused gets into a drunken state after deciding to commit a crime, is an exception to this principle. It was decided in Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher that the accused would be liable for the crime even though they were too drunk to forgather the required mental element. Lord Denning declared the wickedness of his mind ahead he got drunk is enough to condemn him. Although, it has been recognized that it is almost unacceptable that the case envisaged could ever arise. The sale and consumption of alcohol are legal so should we accept the consequences of diminished indebtedness as a cause of criminal activities if perpetrated whilst under the influence?There has been more discussion environ the affiliation between alcohol and diseases of the mind. The case of R v Dietschmann concerned a defendant who was intoxicated at the time of the killing that suffered from a mental abnormality due to a recent bereavement. Lord Hutton state drink cannot be taken into account as something whic h contributed to his mental abnormality. The main principle is that drunken defendants are not excluded from pleading diminished responsibility or insanity if they suffer from mental abnormalities. Ashworth believes the task of the jury to decide whether the mental abnormality affected the mens rea is fearsomely difficult. Medical experts to some extent aid the task of the jury but the margin for error is profound as the effect of drink and drugs is unique to every individual. It has also been argued that there could potentially be a genetic predisposition to alcoholism but the scope of this is unknown.Tolmies conceptualizations of the disease model and the habit model are eccentric and provide light recovery from psychoanalytic evaluations. I oddly enjoy the fact that she has highlighted the importance of normal human processesand bad choices, which are often overlooked. She concentrates on the need for treatment for defendants and does not fall into the hole of defining intoxic ation as an express defence. The current position of the law in this area is unfair as it deforms other doctrines, supports unprincipled sentencing and punishes some defendants far more than they deserve. Adoption of a generic, doctrinal mitigating excuse of partial responsibility with application to all crimes would solve these problems. This alternative option would function in a similar manner to the not proven finding of fact used in Scotland. In the end, to provide blame and punishment reduction based on fair responsibility ascription will not support a denial of responsibility.ReformCertain statutes expressly state that a defendant has a defence if they possess particular beliefs. Does this apply where a belief is acquired through intoxication? There is only one type of case where an intoxicated belief can be used as a defence. In the case of Jaggard v Dickinson, the defendant appealed against a conviction of reckless criminal damage to property. The accused, owing to volunt ary intoxication, mistakenly but honestly believed that she was damaging the property of a friend and that they would have consented to her doing so. A major anomaly in the law is found when the approach taken in Jaggard is contrasted with that taken in Majewski where the Criminal Justice pretend 1967 was not relied upon. Wells has commented that it is difficult to see howthe sections perform any different function. The area surrounding drunken mistakes is just one theme form with uncertainty. There has been much discussion of reform regarding the position of intoxication in the law. The concepts of basic and specific intent are ambiguous, confusing and misleading. The Law Commission has created a proposal to abandon them but the substance of the distinction has been retained. The main question regarding the specific and basic intent dichotomy is the affect it has on the voluntary intoxicated defendants liability.The blameworthiness of the defendant is expressed by an evaluation o f criminal liability. An enlightened system of criminal justice should respond differently to common criminals and voluntary intoxicated defendants. If a man commits mischief when intoxicated, should society take steps in the framework of the criminal law to prevent him? Judicial insistence upon the requirement of mens rea might submit the problem of antisocial drinking but alternatives will not develop if the courts allow these problems to be thrust upon them. The Majewski decision has been criticized as it allows conviction for causing harm where mens rea has not been formed. This is even the case where a defendant is convicted of a basic intent offence instead of a stricter specific intent offence. The House of Lords decision acknowledged the principle of allowing intoxication to be adduced to show that the mens rea for specific intent offences did not exist.They were persuaded by policy objectives to convict of basic intent offences despite the intoxication. This midway course is acceptable on policy grounds but it fails to accord with the basic principles of justice in the criminal law. Is this a clear and licit compromise? The idea to secure conviction for serious offences without satisfying the criteria of mens rea is conjured. This conflicts with the excite of proof, which is placed on the prosecution. This means the false objective recklessness test allows conviction of offences, which require proof of subjective recklessness. The current rationale of the law is that the subjective reckless involved in congruous intoxicated is the moral equivalent of the subjective recklessness usually required for liability. A further criticism is that recklessness relates to the risk of becoming intoxicated and not to the risk of specific harm being caused.As a result, the liability for the harm caused whilst intoxicated goes against the principle of contemporaneity and is constructive, which is hostile to the trend of current law reform. The English law refo rm bodies have created proposals to replace Majewski with a separate offence of intoxication. This separate offence would abate the possibility of a complete acquittal, which is available in specific intent crimes. A disadvantage to the proposal would be the construction of a placement offence with no mens rea involved.This contrasts with previous social policy illustrated in the case of Reniger v Fogossa where a drunken killer was hanged to death to protect human life. However, the Criminal Law Revision Committee rejected the idea of a new offence of intoxication and instead suggested the codification of the law, whilst approving the reckless test. Authors such as Jeremy Horder, who depicted the Law Commissions efforts as making little effort to discern any deeper principles underlying the common law, have criticized the Law Commission attempts at clarifying the law. The reform bodies now intend to amend their previous proposals and return to the subject with a stripped down appr oach.ConclusionWhy is it taking an unbounded amount of time to evaluate reform of the law on intoxication when 61% of the population perceives alcohol-related violence as worsening? The bare components of the law on intoxication are complex but the added series of exceptions that the Law Commission have proposed to introduce, in my opinion, will undermine the principle of justice in England and Wales. The common law has found a reasonable balance between the subjective and absolutist theories but the midway course of specific and basic intent is not satisfactory. The dichotomy requires the courts to evaluate individual criminal acts on their merits putting them into a category of specific or basic intent, which squanders the courts time and thus, decreases the overall inefficiency of the legal system. Childs ripe approach involving the correlation with subjective recklessness is an alternative to the recent reform proposals.He declares intoxication will constitute fault only where the burden is replaced by subjective reasonableness and if the defendant would have foreseen the risk if sober. The midway course is preserved but in a clear and logical manner without a list of exceptions. However, I disagree with Childs interpretation of intoxication as the equivalent to recklessness. I believe more research needs to be given to determine the extent of their tie-in and ultimately decide whether they are analogous or mutually exclusive. Ultimately, liability is ascertained by the intention element but how can this truly be deduced when automatons are intoxicated? Lady Justice Hallett in the recent case of R v Janusz Czajczynsk commented that drinking to excess and taking drugs seems to us to be something of a two edged sword.It is tempting to view the defence of intoxication as denying a defendant a valueless opportunity to exculpate himself by pleading his own discreditable conduct in getting drunk. However, it is impossible to accurately determine an individua ls thoughts at a precise moment and draw a line where a defendants account matches the truth. Simester suggests the intoxication doctrine is reversed to pull ahead prosecution, becoming constructive liability instead of a defence. I believe there is some accuracy in this initiative but it fails to make out the main problem regarding the mental state of the accused.Should there be a common law or statutory defence of intoxication expressly declared? The courts and the Law Commission know the law is not clear and desire to reform the law only after exploring every open avenue. The Law Commission has rightly prioritized consistency, precision and simplicity in their Reports but another round of re-evaluation is definitely needed before a firm conclusion can be established. We can only hope that time does run out, allowing the reform debate to finish sooner rather than later.